Glossary of Kant's Technical Terms
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The following Glossary lists Kant's
most important technical terms, together with a simple
definition of each. (The terms 'judicial', 'perspective'
and 'standpoint' are the only ones Kant himself does
not use as technical terms.) It was originally written
as a study aide to help make the intricate web of
Kant's terminology comprehensible to students who
had little or no familiarity with Kant's writings.
Where relevant, the opposite term is given in curved
brackets at the end of the definition. When a word
defined herein (or a slightly different form of such
a word) is used in the course of defining some other
word in this Glossary, its first occurrence in that
definition will be in italics.
a posteriori:
a way of gaining knowledge by appealing to
some particular experience(s). This method
is used to establish empirical and hypothetical
truths. (Cf. a priori.)
a
priori:
a way of gaining knowledge without appealing
to any particular experience(s). This method
is used to establish transcendental and logical
truths. (Cf. a posteriori.)
aesthetic: having to do with sense-perception. In the
first Critique this word refers to space
and time as the necessary conditions for sense-perception.
The first half of the third Critique examines
the subjective purposiveness in our perception
of beautiful or sublime objects in order to
construct a system of aesthetic judgment.
(Cf. teleological.)
analysis: division of a representation into two
opposing representations, with a view towards clarifying
the original representation. Philosophy as metaphysics
employs analysis more than synthesis. (Cf.
synthesis.)
analytic: a statement or an item of knowledge
which is true solely because of its conformity to
some logical laws. (Cf. synthetic.)
appearance: an object of experience, when
viewed from the transcendental perspective.
Though often used as a synonym for phenomenon,
it technically refers to an object considered to be
conditioned by space and time, but not by the
categories. (Cf. thing in itself.)
architectonic: the logical structure given by reason
(especially through the use of twofold and threefold
divisions), which the philosopher should use as a
plan to organize the contents of any system.
autonomy: an action which is determined by the subject's
own free choice (see will). In the second Critique,
moral action is defined as being autonomous. (Cf.
heteronomy.)
categorical
imperative:
a command which expresses a general, unavoidable
requirement of the moral law. Its three forms
express the requirements of universalizability, respect
and autonomy. Together they establish that an action
is properly called 'morally good' only if (1) we can
will all persons to do it, (2) it enables us to treat
other persons as ends and not merely as the means
to our own selfish ends, and (3) it allows us to see
other persons as mutual law-makers in an ideal 'realm
of ends'.
categories: the most general concepts, in terms
of which every object must be viewed in order
for it to become an object of empirical knowledge.
The four main categories (quantity, quality, relation
and modality) each have three sub-categories, forming
a typical example of a twelvefold, architectonic
pattern. (Cf. space and time.)
concept: the active species of representation,
by means of which our understanding enables
us to think. By requiring perceptions to conform to
the categories, concepts serve as 'rules' allowing
us to perceive general relations between representations.
(Cf. intuition.)
conscience: the faculty of the human subject
which enforces the moral law in a particular
way for each individual by providing an awareness
of what is right and wrong in each situation.
constitutive: playing a fundamental role in making up some
type of knowledge. (Cf. regulative.)
Copernican
revolution:
in astronomy, the theory that the earth revolves around
the sun; in philosophy, the (analogous) theory that
the subject of knowledge does not remain
at rest, but revolves around (i.e., actively determines
certain aspects of) the object. Thus, the formal
characteristics of the empirical world (i.e.,
space and time and the categories) are
there only because the subject's mind puts
them there, transcendentally.
Critical: Kant's lifelong approach to philosophy which
distinguishes between different perspectives
and then uses such distinctions to settle otherwise
unresolvable disputes. The Critical approach is not
primarily negative, but is an attempt to adjudicate
quarrels by showing the ways in which both sides have
a measure of validity, once their perspective is properly
understood. Kant's system of Critical philosophy
emphasizes the importance of examining the structure
and limitations of reason itself.
Critique: to use the method of synthesis together
with a critical approach to doing philosophy.
This term appears in the titles of the three main
books in Kant's Critical philosophy, which adopt the
theoretical, practical and judicial
standpoints, respectively. The purpose of Critical
philosophy is to prepare a secure foundation for metaphysics.
(Cf. metaphysics.)
disposition: the tendency a person has at a given point
in time to act in one way or another (i.e., to obey
the moral law or to disobey it). (Cf. predisposition.)
duty: an action which we are obligated to perform
out of respect for the moral law.
empirical: one of Kant's four main perspectives,
aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which
is both synthetic and a posteriori.
Most of the knowledge we gain through ordinary experience,
or through science, is empirical. 'This table is brown'
is a typical empirical statement. (Cf. transcendental).
experience: the combination of an intuition with
a concept in the form of a judgment.
'Experience' in this 'mediate' sense is a synonym
for 'empirical knowledge'. The phrase 'possible
experience' refers to a representation which
is presented to our sensibility through intuition,
but is not yet known, because it has not been presented
to our understanding through concepts.
'Experience' in this sense is 'immediate' and contrasts
with 'knowledge'.
faculty: a fundamental power of human subjects
to do something or perform some rational function.
faith: a rational attitude towards a potential object
of knowledge which arises when we are subjectively
certain it is true even though we are unable to gain
theoretical or objective certainty.
By contrast, knowledge implies objective and subjective
certainty, while opinion is the state of having neither
objective nor subjective certainty. Kant encouraged
a more humble approach to philosophy by claiming
to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith-i.e.,
by distinguishing between what we can know empirically
and what is transcendent, which we can approach
only by means of faith.
formal: the active or subjective aspect of
something-that is, the aspect which is based on the
rational activity of the subject. (Cf.
material.)
heteronomy: an action which is determined by some outside
influence (i.e., some force other than the freedom
given by practical reason, such as inclination)
impelling the subject to act in a certain way.
Such action is nonmoral (i.e., neither moral nor immoral).
(Cf. autonomy.)
hypothetical: one of Kant's four main perspectives,
aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which
is both analytic and a posteriori (though
Kant himself wrongly identified it as synthetic
and a priori). Most metaphysical knowledge
is properly viewed from this perspective, instead
of from the speculative perspective of traditional
metaphysics. 'There is a God' is a typical
hypothetical statement. (Cf. logical).
ideas: the species of representation which
gives rise to metaphysical beliefs. Ideas are special
concepts which arise out of our knowledge
of the empirical world, yet seem to point beyond
nature to some transcendent realm. The three
most important metaphysical ideas are God, freedom
and immortality.
imagination: the faculty responsible for forming
concepts out of the 'manifold of intuition'
and for synthesizing intuitions with concepts to form
objects which are ready to be judged.
inclination: the faculty or object which
motivates a person to act in a heteronomous
way. Following inclinations is neither morally good
nor morally bad, except when doing so directly prevents
a person from acting according to duty-i.e.,
only when choosing to obey an inclination results
in disobedience to the moral law.
intelligible: presented to the subject without any
material being provided by sensibility.
It is more or less equivalent to the terms supersensible
and transcendent. (Cf. sensible.)
intuition: the passive species of representation,
by means of which our sensibility enables
to have sensations. By requiring appearances
to be given in space and time, intuitions allow
us to perceive particular relations between representations,
thereby limiting empirical knowledge
to the sensible realm. (Cf. concept.)
judgment: in the first Critique, the use of
the understanding by which an object
is determined to be empirically real, through
a synthesis of intuitions and concepts.
The third Critique examines the form of our
feelings of pleasure and displeasure in order to construct
a system based on the faculty of judgment
(= the judicial standpoint) in its aesthetic
and teleological manifestations. (Cf.
reason.)
judicial: one of Kant's three main standpoints,
relating primarily to experience-i.e., to
what we feel, as opposed to what we know or desire
to do. Judicial reason is virtually synonymous
with 'Critique' itself, and is concerned with
questions about the most profound ways in which we
experience the world. Finding the source of
two examples of such experiences is the task of the
third Critique. (Cf. theoretical and
practical.)
knowledge: the final goal of the understanding
in combining intuitions and concepts.
If they are pure, the knowledge will be transcendental;
if they are impure, the knowledge will be empirical.
In a looser sense, 'knowledge' also refers to that
which arises out adopting any legitimate perspective.
logical: one of Kant's four main perspectives,
aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which
is both analytic and a priori. Hence
it is concerned with nothing but the relationships
between concepts. The law of noncontradiction
(A is not -A) is the fundamental law of traditional,
Aristotelian logic. (If we call this 'analytic' logic,
then 'synthetic' logic would be based on the
opposite law of 'contradiction' [A is -A].) 'All
bachelors are unmarried' is a typical logical statement.
(Cf. hypothetical.)
material: the passive or objective aspect of
something-that is, the aspect which is based on the
experience a subject has, or on the
objects given in such an experience. (Cf. formal.)
maxim: the material rule or principle used
to guide a person in a particular situation about
what to do (e.g., 'I should never tell a lie'). It
thus provides a kind of bridge between a persons inner
disposition and outer actions.
metaphysics: the highest form of philosophy, which attempts
to gain knowledge of the ideas. Because the
traditional, speculative perspective fails
to succeed in this task, Kant suggests a new, hypothetical
perspective for metaphysics. Metaphysics can succeed
only when it is preceded by Critique. (Cf.
Critique.)
moral
law:
the one 'fact' of practical reason,
which is in every rational person, though
some people are more aware of it than others. The
moral law, in essence, is our knowledge of
the difference between good and evil, and our inner
conviction that we ought to do what is good. (See
categorical imperative.)
noumenon: the name given to a thing when it is viewed
as a transcendent object. The term 'negative
noumenon' refers only to the recognition of something
which is not an object of sensible intuition,
while 'positive noumenon' refers to the (quite mistaken)
attempt to know such a thing as an empirical
object. These two terms are sometimes used loosely
as synonyms for 'transcendental object' and
'thing in itself', respectively. (Cf. phenomenon.)
object: a general term for any 'thing' which is conditioned
by the subject's representation, and so is
capable of being known. The thing in itself
is a thing which cannot become an object. (Cf. subject;
see thing in itself.)
objective: related more to the object or representation
out of which knowledge is constructed than
to the subject possessing the knowledge. Considered
transcendentally, objective knowledge is less
certain than subjective knowledge; considered
empirically, objective knowledge is more certain.
(Cf. subjective.)
perspective: a way of thinking about or considering something;
or a set of assumptions from which an object
can be viewed. Knowing which perspective is assumed
is important because the same question can have different
answers if different perspectives are assumed. Kant
himself does not use this word, but he uses a number
of other expressions (such as standpoint, way
of thinking, employment of understanding, etc.)
in precisely this way. The main Critical perspectives
are the transcendental, empirical, logical
and hypothetical.
phenomenon: the object of knowledge, viewed
empirically, in its fully knowable state (i.e.,
conditioned by space and time and the categories).
(Cf. noumenon.)
practical: one of Kant's three main standpoints,
relating primarily to action -i.e., to what we desire
to do as opposed to what we know or feel. Practical
reason is a synonym for will; and these
two terms are concerned with questions of morality.
Finding the sources of such action is the task of
the second Critique. (Cf. theoretical
and judicial.)
predisposition: the natural tendency a person has, apart
from (or before having) any experience, to
be morally good or evil. (Cf. disposition.)
pure: not mixed with anything sensible.
Although its proper opposite is 'impure', Kant normally
opposes 'pure' to 'empirical'.
rational: grounded in the faculty of reason
rather than in sensibility. (See also intelligible.)
reality: if regarded from the empirical perspective,
this refers to the ordinary world of nature; if regarded
from the transcendental perspective, it refers
to the transcendent realm of the noumenon.
reason: in the first Critique, the highest
faculty of the human subject, to which
all other faculties are subordinated. It abstracts
completely from the conditions of sensibility.
The second Critique examines the form of our
desires in order to construct a system based
on the faculty of reason (= the practical standpoint).
Reason's primary function is practical; its
theoretical function, though often believed
to be more important, should be viewed as having a
secondary importance. (Cf. judgment.)
regulative: providing important guidelines for how knowledge
should be used, yet not itself playing any fundamental
role in making up that knowledge. (Cf. constitutive.)
religion: the way of acting, or perspective,
according to which we interpret all our duties
as divine commands.
representation: the most general word for an object
at any stage in its determination by the subject,
or for the subjective act of forming the object
at that level. The main types of representations are
intuitions, concepts and ideas.
In the first Critique, the understanding is the dominant
faculty in processing representations, while in the
third Critique the faculty of imagination is dominant.
Sometimes translated as 'presentation'.
schematism: the function of the faculty of imagination,
through which concepts and intuitions
are combined, or synthesized, according to
a rule (called a schema). In the first Critique,
this function is presented as one of the steps required
in order for the understanding to produce empirical
knowledge.
sensibility: the faculty concerned with passively
receiving objects. This is accomplished primarily
in the form of physical and mental sensations (via
'outer sense' and 'inner sense', respectively). However,
such sensations are possible only if the objects are
intuited, and intuition depends on space
and time existing in their pure form as
well. (Cf. understanding.)
sensible: presented to the subject by means of
sensibility. (Cf. intelligible.)
space
and time:
considered from the empirical perspective,
they form the context in which objects interact
outside of us; considered from the transcendental
perspective, they are pure, so they exist inside
of us as conditions of knowledge. (Cf. categories.)
speculative: the illusory perspective which wrongly
uses reason in a hopeless attempt to gain
knowledge about something transcendent.
Sometimes used loosely as a synonym of theoretical.
standpoint: the special type of perspective which
determines the point from which a whole system
of perspectives is viewed. The main Critical
standpoints are the theoretical, practical
and judicial.
subject: a general term for any rational person
who is capable of having knowledge. (Cf. object;
see also representation.)
subjective: related more to the subject than to
the object or representation out of
which knowledge is constructed. Considered
transcendentally, subjective knowledge is
more certain that objective knowledge; considered
empirically, subjective knowledge is less
certain. (Cf. objective.)
summum
bonum:
Latin for highest good. This is the ultimate goal
of the moral system presented in the second
Critique; it involves the ideal distribution
of happiness in exact proportion to each person's
virtue. In order to conceive of its possibility,
we must postulate the existence of God and human immortality,
thus giving these ideas practical reality.
supersensible: see intelligible and transcendent.
synthesis: integration of two opposing representations
into one new representation, with a view towards
constructing a new level of the object's reality.
Philosophy as Critique employs synthesis more
than analysis. On the operation of synthesis
in the first Critique, see imagination.
(Cf. analysis.)
synthetic: a statement or item of knowledge which
is known to be true because of its connection with
some intuition. (Cf. analytic.)
system: a set of basic facts or arguments (called
'elements') arranged according to the order of their
logical relationships, as determined by the
architectonic patterns of reason.
Kant's Critical philosophy is a System made
up of three subordinate systems, each defined by
a distinct standpoint, and each made up of
the same four perspectives.
teleological: having to do with purposes or ends. The second
half of the third Critique examines the objective
purposiveness in our perception of natural organisms
in order to construct a system of teleological
judgment.
theoretical: one of Kant's three main standpoints,
relating primarily to cognition-i.e., to what we know
as opposed to what we feel or desire to do. Theoretical
reason is concerned with questions about our
knowledge of the ordinary world (the world
science seeks to understand). Finding the source of
such knowledge is the task of the first Critique,
which would best be entitled the Critique of Pure
'Theoretical' Reason. (Cf. practical and
judicial; see speculative.)
thing
in itself:
an object considered transcendentally
apart from all the conditions under which a subject
can gain knowledge of it. Hence the thing in
itself is, by definition, unknowable. Sometimes used
loosely as a synonym of noumenon. (Cf. appearance.)
time: see space and time.
transcendent: the realm of thought which lies beyond the
boundary of possible knowledge, because it
consists of objects which cannot be presented
to us in intuition-i.e., objects which we can
never experience with our senses (sometimes
called noumena). The closest we can get to
gaining knowledge of the transcendent realm is to
think about it by means of ideas. (The opposite
of 'transcendent' is 'immanent'.)
transcendental: one of Kant's four main perspectives,
aiming to establish a kind of knowledge which
is both synthetic and a priori. It is
a special type of philosophical knowledge, concerned
with the necessary conditions for the possibility
of experience. However, Kant believes all knowing
subjects assume certain transcendental truths,
whether or not they are aware of it. Transcendental
knowledge defines the boundary between empirical
knowledge and speculation about the transcendent
realm. 'Every event has a cause' is a typical transcendental
statement. (Cf. empirical.)
transcendental
object:
an object considered transcendentally
insofar as it has been presented to a subject,
but is not yet represented in any determined
way-i.e., not yet influenced by space and time
or by the categories. Also called an 'object
in general'.
understanding: in the first Critique, the faculty
concerned with actively producing knowledge
by means of concepts. This is quite similar
to what is normally called the mind. It gives rise
to the logical perspective, which enables
us to compare concepts with each other, and to the
empirical perspective (where it is also called
judgment), which enables us to combine concepts
with intuitions in order to produce empirical
knowledge. The first Critique examines the
form of our cognitions in order to construct a system
based on the faculty of understanding (= the
theoretical standpoint). (Cf. sensibility.)
will: the manifestation of reason in its
practical form (see practical). The
two German words, 'Willkьr' and 'Wille' can both be
translated in English as 'will'. Willkьr refers to
the faculty of choice, which for Kant is just
one (empirical) function of the more fundamental
faculty of practical reason (= Wille).
Source:
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/ksp1/KSPglos.html
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