On Idioms, Intertextuality, Puddings, and Quantum Physics
(all of them in simultaneous, please)
By Carlo Marzocchi
Ph.D. Program in Translation and Intercultural Studies
Universitat Rovira i Virgili
cmarzocchi@libero.it
http://www.accurapid.com/journal/32idioms.htm
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These
notes were triggered by an anecdote recently reported
by trainee interpreters at the European Court of Justice
(ECJ). The anecdote has to do with the way interpreters
handle idiomatic expressions and more generally what
is known as "culture-bound" items, or realia.
I will suggest some insights from Translation Studies
and draw attention to the practice of translation
at the European Court of Justice, in an attempt to
question received ideas as to how to translate idioms
in the booth. Finally, I shall touch on the role of
language work in multilingual organizations.
The facts and some theory
Here is the anecdote: at a hearing
of a case at the ECJ, spring 2004: novice colleagues,
after studying the usual pile of case documents, are
practicing in the dummy Polish booth, coping with
a case referred by the German jurisdiction for labour
issues, the Bundesarbeitsgericht. The language
of the case is German, with one party intervening
in English. Suddenly one of the parties refers in
English to the need to wait and see the results of
a particular development, because, he argues, "the
proof of the pudding is in the eating." The Polish
colleague renders the idiomatic expression in plain
language, neutralizing it, because, as she reports
later, "we don't say that in Polish."
So far so good, inasmuch as she gets
the main point across to her listeners. Yet, as colleagues
will have witnessed, speakers like to re-cycle imagery:
later on, another participant refers to what the previous
speaker has said, takes up the "pudding"
image again and develops it, half-jokingly, for what
must have seemed an endless time to the other colleague
on the mike at the moment, who cannot refer back to
anything similar in the output of her booth-mate.
In scholarly terms, this is a textbook
example of intertextuality, i.e., roughly,
of a text referring to or re-using an item taken from
another text. And of course this characterizes oral
as much as written communication. The notion may seem
trivial but has consequences for those who study and
teach interpreting, since it implies that, strictly
speaking, you should not evaluate an interpreting
performance only on the basis of a single stretch
of "text," e.g. an individual intervention
at a conference, a plenary speech, a plea in court
and so on. By doing so you would loose sight of all
intertextual references to other texts in the same
event, whereas for those listening to the original
those references were visible and part of the overall
meaning associated with the event. In other words,
the unit of measure when studying interpreting should
be the whole event. The point was aptly made among
others by Franz Pöchhacker in his seminal Simultandolmetschen
als komplexes Handeln (1994), where it is suggested
that we should see the whole interpreted event as
a hypertext, a network of cross-references
between individual texts.
Thus armed with a solid notion of
intertextuality, we are perhaps ready for a
change of perspective on the anecdote. But first let
me note that such incidents are by no means rare.
In fact, a similar one (referred to in the admittedly
obscure title of these notes) occurred at the same
hearing, this time involving two languages and a slight
misunderstanding. One of the parties suggested that
interpreting the existing case-law as requested by
the counterpart would amount to a "quantum leap"
in EU legal practice, meaning, I suppose, a very radical
change. The image itself displays an interesting overlapping
of meanings: it refers both to a complex scientific
notion from quantum physics and to a popular sci-fi
TV series, where the main character travels in time
thanks to a machine allowing "quantum leaps."
Predictably, the image did not go unnoticed and was
taken up again by a German-speaking participant in
a lengthy and nebulous digression. The comment started
with the inevitable "and since quantum physics
has been mentioned...," and developed on the
original scientific meaning of "quantum leap."
Whether the reference to physics was accurate, I am
in no position to judge. What is certain is that this
expression caused the same problems in the Italian
booth (we had not used the original "quantum
leap" image the first time) as the "pudding"
one did to the Polish colleagues.
The anecdote puzzling the Polish colleagues
is thus by no means isolated. Going back to the possible
solutions, the point here is not whether in Polish
you do or do not say "the proof of the pudding
is in the eating" or whether the literal "salto
quantico" makes any sense to Italian listeners
(in the algid setting of the ECJ, on top of that).
Asking only these questions leads us to translate
in a way that is certainly satisfactory, but fails
to take into account the whole event as a hypertext.
The Polish colleague omitting the reference to
puddings did in fact provide a fairly adequate translation
of that individual utterance. The same goes for the
solution adopted by the Italian booth in the "quantum
leap" case. The problem is that these solutions
deprive listeners, and colleagues taking the next
turn in the booth, of references that will later be
used intertextually within the event. In plain words,
solutions that omit the original image in idiomatic
expressions may create difficulties some time later,
when references to that very image surface up again,
in the same or another language.
Before going on, let me briefly deal
with a legitimate objection: of course we are talking
about a minor problem compared, for example,
to the interpreter not knowing what the Bundesarbeitsgericht
or a preliminary ruling by the ECJ are. The fact that
listeners of the Polish booth would not have had the
opportunity to smile at the second reference to puddings
hardly has any impact on the successful conduct of
an ECJ hearing. Point taken. Yet, the fact that the
anecdote was discussed at some length by colleagues
after the hearing shows that minor things like these
do challenge our skills, so we had better be equipped
with conceptual tools for that challenge. Moreover,
apprentice interpreters can easily learn what a preliminary
ruling is, whereas coming up with a solution for the
hearing's quantum leaps and puddings involves some
more reflection. In turn, this can cast some light
on the wider issue of our role as interpreters and
translators.
Looking around for solutionstranslating
realia and idioms
So, assuming that this is a problem,
what is the solution, then? The first thing to note
is that idioms and cultural references like the ones
we are dealing with can be accommodated in a broader
definition of realia, i.e. lexical items designating
elements specific to a particular culture. See for
example the following definition, originally by the
Bulgarian scholars Vlahov and Florin, and quoted by
B. Osimo in an online course on translation theory
(http://www.logos.it/lang/transl_en.html):
[realia are] words (and composed expressions)
[...] representing denominations of objects, concepts,
typical phenomena of a given geographic place, of
material life or of social-historical peculiarities
of some people, nation, country, tribe [sic],
that for this reason carry a national, local or historical
color; these words do not have exact matches in
other languages (my emphasis).
A couple of examples from Vlahov and
Florin's list of "political and social"
realia can clarify the kind of translation problems
we are talking about: think of how you would "translate"
into your own language county, canton, princedom,
bidonville, arrondissement, suk, promenade, corso,
prospekt, agora, storting, kneset, duma, czar, doge,
vizier, alcalde, ayatollah, satrap, Bürgermeister,
Union Jack, fleur de lis, and so on.
Set against this definition of realia,
both our examples appear to designate objects or concepts
typical of a given culture: traditional British cultureBritish
cuisine?in the case of the pudding, American
sci-fi in the case of the quantum leap. Neither of
them has "exact matches" (whatever this
means) in our target languages. Both phrases carry
some "local colour," as is witnessed by
the fact that other speakers felt compelled to take
them up again and develop on them, perhaps in order
to enrich their own speech with some humour. That's
why I argue that phrases like these can be considered
as a specific type of realia.
As is often the case in legal reasoning,
and occasionally in scholarly argument on translation
too, once you agree on how to categorize something,
you already have a clue as to how to handle it. So
how do you go about translating realia? The
standard answer is that you choose from the weaponry
of translation techniques ranging from transcription,
through loan and calque, to various ways of
explaining what the item is. One end
of the range is more controversial: the search for
a cultural or functional equivalent to substitute
for the original. Basically, techniques mentioned
in scholarly discussion of realia are still
the ones exemplified decades ago by Vinay and Darbelnet
in their epoch-making Stilistique comparée
du français et de l'anglais of 1958 (but
see Molina & Hurtado Albir 2002 for an update
on translation techniques).
Even more than with single-word realia,
when dealing with set phrases like the ones in our
examples, language professionals are keen to search
for a cultural equivalent, as is witnessed for example
by the many multilingual lists of idioms circulating
in interpreter-training institutions. One important
point to be made is that translators will to some
extent mix the available techniques, partly depending
on factors such as text type and function. A good
example of this are bilingual in-flight magazines:
here, substitution of the realia by a (supposed)
cultural equivalent is frequent, perhaps because the
two versions are meant to be read independently (that
is, unless the readers are frequently traveling interpreters
suffering from a serious professional deformation).
This would imply that articles are to be entertaining
in each language separately. The translation consequently
focuses on naturalness and ease of reading, and is
highly idiomatic, sometimes even more so than the
original. On occasions, an entirely different realia
or idiom is deemed equivalent to the original, on
other occasions the realia is neutralized and "de-localized"
into something less culturally marked; all these techniques
can be seen in the following extracts from a recent
issue of a German-English in-flight magazine. The
examples are from an interview with a German actress
who discusses her humble origins:
| German
Text |
English
Text |
Translation
Technique |
| Die
Presse mag die Geschichte des Mädchen
aus dem Kartoffelkeller, das zum Filmstar
wird |
The press likes a story about the Cinderella
who became a celebrated film star |
The original phrase, hardly an idiom in German,
was translated with a shared cultural item:
"the girl from the potato-cellar"
becomes "Cinderella." In fact, the
girl's family did sell potatoes |
|
Ich habe auch kein Problem mit dem Klischee
des Superweibs |
Nor do I have a problem with the superwoman
cliché |
The realia comes from media culture:
"Superweib" was the title of a very
successful German featuring this actress. "Superwoman"
in the translation refers to a different realia
established in the target culture |
|
Ist diese die Rolle die Ihnen Achtung in
den Feuilletons gebracht hat? |
Is this the role that brought you recognition
in the art section of the media? |
A reference from social life: arts pages
in German newspapers are often called Feuilleton.
The translation makes this explicit: "the
art section," but neutralizes the cultural
reference |
|
Ich habe bis heute Lampenfieber |
I still get stage fright |
The idiomatic expression, "[spot]lights
fever," is translated with a change of
image |
Back to square one? Maybe not
Once we realize that there are in
fact several ways in which a translator can handle
idioms and cultural items, even in one and the same
text, we can perhaps go back (hopefully not back to
square one, itself a nice idiom) to our interpreting
practice at the ECJ. When participants talk of puddings
and quantum leaps, automatically neutralizing the
cultural references and replacing them with something
that sounds more natural in our TL is not the best
option in terms of intertextual cohesion; plainly,
we leave our colleague helpless against subsequent
occurrences of the same phrase.
We need alternatives, then. If adaptation
or substitution do not work, why not try importing
idioms in our own translation? At first sight
this may seem impracticable. The objection is obvious:
listeners would simply not understand if they suddenly
heard their interpreter talk about puddings and quantum
leaps that happen to be unfamiliar things in their
language. Point taken. But then, and here is where
written translation hopefully comes to rescue my argument,
how is it that the very case documents we study for
hours before ECJ hearings are full of examples of
source language realia imported in the target
text without any attempt at adaptation? And how does
it work?
Let us have a look at it in more detail.
ECJ translators, and legal translators in general,
seem to rely heavily on non-translation when it comes
to a specific category of cultural items, the ones
designating institutions in the source language.
In the language professions we may
be tempted to believe that languages do lead separate
lives and never shall meet except in our talented
multilingual brains or nomadic intercultural lives;
yet the obvious consequence of the above approach
is that in ECJ texts languages happily mix with each
other. I have in front of me the cover page of a document
that uses French, abbreviations and even pictograms
to tell me that it is an English translation: a little
black square appears near the word traduction
and then EN, for English, follows; the title is in
French and German, with no italicizing of the foreign
words: Demande de décision préjudicielle
introduite par le Bundesarbeitsgericht (for reference,
it is case C-284/02, but any ECJ document will do).
The cover page also tells us in French that the language
of the whole proceedings is German. The cover
of another order for referral (C-245/02) claims, in
French, to be an Italian translation, and the language
landscape is even more diverse: it bears the French
title Demande de décision préjudicielle
introduite par le "Korkein Oikeus" (this
time in inverted commas, but why?) and the parties'
names are in English and Czech. The French cover also
tells me that the language of the case is Finnish,
thereby telling me at least where to look for a Korkein
Oikeus if I happen not to know what it is.
This is of course the result of in-house
standards with regard to document formats, for ease
of archiving and retrieval, Yet the interesting thing
is that the very appearance of ECJ translated texts
betrays their nature as translations. Interpreters,
who are often told that their output should sound
like an original speech, should perhaps start wondering
to what extent this is possible and advisable, especially
in a setting where written texts by no means pretend
to be originals, unless they really are.
Non-translation of realia in
ECJ texts
A closer look can help clarify the
way ECJ translators handle institutional references,
and possibly give us some guidance as to how to treat
instances of the "pudding" type. Of course
this implies agreeing that from the point of view
of translation there is not much difference between
an item like Bundesarbeitsgericht and "the
proof of the pudding is in the eating." Looking
back at the definition of realia mentioned
above, both items can be said to be "peculiar
to one nation," to "carry some local colour"
and not to have "direct matches" in another
language. The main difference I can see is that the
name of the German highest labour court designates
an institution materially existing in the social life
of Germany, whereas the idiom is no less an institution,
but one that only leads a de-materialized existence
within the system of the English language and British
culture.
So how do ECJ translating colleagues
render institutional names? Pending a more structured
research, the prevailing technique consists in keeping
the original denomination, especially in headings
and operative parts of the text, and, very often,
inserting a translation or explanation near the original
item, at least on one of its first occurrences in
the text.
Other aspects of the ECJ's translators'
approach to institutional realia are worth
noting: for example, the policy prevailing for institutional
names also applies to less material institutions such
as the title and indeed the acronyms designating national
laws: the following excerpts show instances of this
in the English and Italian translations of the German
text:
| English
Translation |
Italian
Translation |
|
protection pursuant to Para. 6 of the Mutterschutzgesetz
(Maternity protection law)
|
ai sensi dell'art. 6 MuSchG |
|
maternity leave pursuant to [...] the Labour
Code of the German Democratic Republic (AGB-DDR)
|
congedo di maternità [...] ai sensi
dell' [...] AGB-DDR |
|
leave referred to in the [...] Arbeitsgesetzbuch
der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Labour
Code of the German Democratic Republic, hereinafter
"AGB-DDR"
|
congedo di maternità ai sensi dell'
[...] Arbeitsgesetzbuch der Deutschen
Demokratischen Republik (Codice del lavoro della
Repubblica Democratica Tedesca; in prosieguo:
l'AGB-DDR) |
All this may seem far from our own
practice in the booth. Yet I am sure that a similar
approach to institutional names is used by interpreters.
In the hearing of this case they will probably have
used, in their respective languages, the German word
Bundesarbeitsgericht, possibly with an approximate
pronunciation and perhaps followed by a translation
or explanation of what this is. Some interpreters
may even have used the German title of the law, Mutterschutzgesetz
(I, for one, did)although few will have dared
to utter the acronym MuSchG, pace our
translating colleagues.
In conclusion: why shouldn't we, then?
Now, if you have followed my argument
to this point you will probably expect the next step:
what is the difference between uttering a German word
like Bundesarbeitsgericht, or Mutterschutzgesetz,
in your Polish or Italian output in the booth, and
then explaining to what social or legal institution
it refers, and uttering the English word pudding
when used in an idiomatic expressionif time
allows, of course? Or even, and this takes my argument
a bit further, what prevents us from uttering the
whole idiomatic expression, either in the original
language, or in a very literal translation, and then
explaining what it means? This would give you
or your colleague enough material to develop on, should
the idiom be used again in the course of the proceedings.
Besides, it would give your listeners the benefit
of a compact lesson in cross-cultural awareness, to
the extent that they would learn, from you, that the
British only trust their puddings when they eat them.
So why are we so reluctant, when interpreting,
to say things that sound slightly oddslightly
foreignto our listeners? Of course it is difficult
to have the meaning of an idiom on the tip of your
tongue, and find the time to explain it; yet this
must not be more difficult than decoding, say, a Tarifvertrag
zur Anpassung des Tarifsrechts. My impression
is that there must be other reasons why interpreters
are reluctant to approach idioms in the same way as
translators approach legal realia.
The first reason has to do with the
interpreter's role as both they themselves and society
perceive it. If you approach the idiom as a realia,
and you explain it instead of replacing with an equivalent
one (but who decides that two idioms are equivalent?
Dictionaries? Your interpreting teacher? Do you really
trust them?) in your target language, you may seem
to be getting across to your readers two messages:
a message from the speaker, i.e. the meaning
of the idiomatic expression, and a message about
the speaker and his cultural background: in this case,
this would be the fact that he chose to put his point
in idiomatic terms, trying to strike a lighter note
perhaps, and that his culture uses that particular
image. More plainly, one could say you are adding
something that was not there in the original.
The question is, of course, if as an interpreter you
are entitled to get the latter message across and
to add this little something. In my opinion you certainly
are. You are entitled to add the explanation of the
idiom because your listeners need it to have a full
picture of who is talking to them. And you are entitled
to get the second message across for the very simple
reason that the message about the speaker and
his language use was already there in the original,
for listeners who share the same cultural background.
In sum, by treating the proof of the pudding like
you would treat the Bundesarbeitsgericht you
are not really adding anything to the original message
as perceived by source language listenersand
you are safeguarding your ability to reestablish intertextual
references in your output.
The second reason why this is not
done systematically has to do with what is expected
of language work in multilingual organizations. To
understand this, we need another theoretical notion,
that of documentary versus instrumental
translation. The distinction, which builds upon
ages of scholarly debate on for instance free vs.
literal translation (or formal vs. dynamic equivalence,
or overt vs. covert translation), is originally by
Christiane Nord (see 1999); it is also reported clearly
in an online article by Andrew Chesterman (see 2000):
A documentary translation is manifestly
a document of another text, it is overtly a translation
of something else. Insofar as it presents itself as
a report of another communication, it is a bit like
reported speech. Instrumental translation, on the
other hand, functions as an instrument of communication
in its own right, it works independently of a source
text, and is judged on how well it expresses its message.
The distinction is important because
it makes clear the contradictory requirements imposed
on language work in multilingual organizations. Most
of the training you receive as an interpreter, and
of the deontological discourse within the profession,
seem to point at an instrumental translation. Your
output as an interpreter has to be as "deverbalized"
as possible from the original wording, as convincing
as possible as a speech in the target language in
its own right. Ask seasoned interpreters which remark
flatters them most, and many will probably answer
"when my customers tell me that I did not even
sound like I was interpreting." This is certainly
justified when it comes to the usability of your output
(fluency, register, intonation, pauses). However,
the need for a usable, instrumental output must not
be misconstrued: it cannot imply that an interpreter's
output must not contain anything that sounds odd,
or foreign, such as an unexpected image taken from
an idiomatic expression in the source language. Because
in this way we would be stuck in good old untranslatability,
a ghost often haunting scholars, every time an idiom
like the pudding one is used, with, as we have
seen, a loss of intertextual references and ultimately
a failure in communication (although admittedly a
minor one).
This looks all the more strange if
we go back to ECJ case documents. As we have seen,
they announce their status as a translation on the
first page, they are full of word and phrases in different
languages with translations in brackets; they are
interspersed with bracketed dots (...) indicating
that items from the original have been left out (by
the translator) as irrelevant, and at times
they even carry the original page numbering at the
margin, for ease of reference. In short, the translation
of ECJ case documents are certainly more on the documentary
side. So why should language work in a single institution
like the ECJ follow two contradictory norms, a documentary
one in writing and an instrumental one orally? The
paradox is even more obvious if you think that the
readership of translated documents and the audience
of interpreted pleas at the ECJ is often the same
group of legal experts, who are used to functioning
in a multilingual environment. So why should they
be deceived into believing that what they are getting
in their headphone is an original speech in the target
language?
With reference to his experience in
bilingual Canada, Brian Mossop (see 1990) has aptly
argued that having translations look completely idiomatic
in the target language, neutralizing all foreign elements,
implies masking important aspects of the social and
political reality in which the translation came into
being. Going back to our anecdotes, is there any reason
to mask puddings and quantum leaps? Is there any reason
why our listeners should not perceive, through our
translation, that the original speaker draw on resources
from his traditional British cultural background?
Envoi (hey, you do not say
that in English!)
Possibly. But this French word is a handy way to
introduce a conclusion. If they have followed me until
now, readers will forgive the loan. In these notes
I hope to have shown
- that neutralizing phraseology,
or replacing idioms with natural-sounding equivalents
in the target language deprives our listeners and
colleagues of meaningful cultural information, and
that this information was there in the original;
- that in terms of translation technique
there is little difference between the dreaded idioms
and all other cultural and institutional referencesrealiafound
in our texts;
- that, broadly speaking, both types
of items can be handled in the same documentary
way by the interpreter in the booth, similarly to
how translators handle institutional realia in
ECJ documents.
In doing so, I have referred to sources
as disparate as in-flight magazines, legal translations,
scholarly work done in the 1970's in Bulgaria and
the 1990s in Germany and Canada. Whether I have convinced
you remains to be seen. After all, the proof of the
pudding...
References
Chesterman, A. 2000. "Translation
typology." In A. Veisbergs and I. Zauberga (eds.),
The Second Riga Symposium on Pragmatic Aspects
of Translation. Riga: University of Latvia, 49-62.
Online with other papers by Chesterman at http://www.helsinki.fi/~chesterm/2000bTypes.html.
Molina, L., and Hurtado Albir, A.
2002. "Translation Techniques Revisited: A Dynamic
and Functionalist Approach" in META XLVII,
4, pp. 498-512.
Mossop, B. 1990. "Translating
Institutions and 'Idiomatic' Translation," in
META XXXV,2, pp. 342-355. Recent issues of
META are online at http://www.erudit.org/revue/meta.
Nord, C. 1999. Translating as Purposeful
Activity. Manchester: St. Jerome.
Pöchhacker, Franz. 1994. Simultandolmetschen
als komplexes Handel. Tübingen: Narr.
Vinay, J.-P., and Darbelnet J. 1958.
Stylistique comparée du français
et de l'anglais: méthode de traduction.
Paris: Didier; Montréal: Beauchemin.
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